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Summary
U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s admission that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) cannot simply replace the contractor controlling its telecommunications network exposes a problem that extends well beyond the nation’s air traffic control system. Federal procurement records show that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed comparable dependencies across biometric identification, immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and identity management, sometimes leaving the government without the technical rights needed to maintain or replace critical systems independently.
“I want to get away from L3Harris and get a new one, but they own the network,” Duffy said during a November 15 appearance on NBC’s Meet the Press. “I can’t cancel the network that they own, and I operate on.” Duffy was discussing the November 13 telecommunications failure that triggered a nationwide grounding of commercial aviation in the U.S. The precise cause remained under investigation, but the FAA episode illustrates a problem also documented at DHS: government agencies can become so dependent on contractors' infrastructure and proprietary technology that replacing them is no longer a straightforward procurement decision.
Across DHS, the dependencies take different forms. The department acknowledges that it lacks the source code and technical rights needed to independently maintain parts of its national fingerprint-matching infrastructure. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has cited unacceptable operational risks associated with replacing its principal investigative software, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is examining a contractor transition involving a Border Patrol technical operations center housed in an incumbent-owned facility.
The consequences are not confined to hypothetical system failures. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation found that DHS officials were reluctant to terminate underperforming telecommunications providers because transitioning to alternatives could be equally disruptive. Together, the records show how earlier technology decisions can limit later competition, raise switching costs, and complicate the government’s ability to modernize systems that support identification, investigations, and border security.
Proprietary control of DHS biometric matching One of the clearest examples involves the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), which maintains the biometric identification infrastructure DHS and its law enforcement partners use. In September, DHS awarded Thales DIS USA an $11.2 million sole-source contract to maintain fingerprint-matching technology associated with its legacy Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) modernization program. The department’s October justification acknowledges that it lacks the proprietary source code, technical documentation, interfaces, or intellectual property rights needed for another company to maintain or modify the technology.
Fourteen companies responded to DHS market research, but the department concluded that none could independently support the installed Thales environment. The dependency is especially consequential because HART was intended to replace IDENT, which began operating in 1994, with a more modern and interoperable biometric identity infrastructure. A July 2025 GAO assessment identified the legacy biometric system among critical aging federal technologies, reporting annual operating costs of $156 million and modernization costs estimated at $630 million.
GAO also identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities that could not be remedied without modernization. The report did not attribute those vulnerabilities to Thales technology. Nevertheless, the findings expose overlapping concerns.
DHS must modernize aging biometric infrastructure while retaining proprietary components that competing contractors cannot independently maintain. GAO has also repeatedly questioned HART’s cost estimates and schedules. Although DHS implemented several recommendations during fiscal 2026, public records reviewed for this analysis do not show that it achieved its planned September 2026 modernization milestone or eliminated the Thales dependency.
ICE’s dependence on Palantir expands A similar problem is emerging around ICE’s investigative architecture, where replacing established software could require extensive reconstruction of integrations, workflows, and security authorizations. An April 2025 procurement justification described the difficulty of replacing Palantir technology used to process information from multiple government and external sources. ICE cited migration requirements, alternative software development, personnel training, and the time necessary to authorize a replacement system.
A subsequent justification for ICE’s Investigative Case Management system similarly emphasized established integrations and operational continuity. The reliance is becoming more consequential. In February 2026, DHS established a departmentwide, single-award blanket purchase agreement with Palantir, potentially worth $1 billion over five years, covering software licenses, maintenance, hosting, and implementation services.
The agreement permits other DHS components to obtain Palantir technology through the same contracting vehicle. The department’s justification drew on ICE market research evaluating 42 vendors, raising questions about how requirements from ICE’s investigative environment influenced a purchasing vehicle available across DHS. Contract records identify an approximately $86.3 million ICE order in May, another worth $45.8 million in June, and a $32.1 million September software-as-a-service order by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
The agreement creates a mechanism to expand reliance on the company’s proprietary software. ICE retains ownership of its underlying government data and has included migration requirements in its procurements. Whether those protections are sufficient to reproduce customized applications, data relationships, and investigative workflows on a competing platform remains unresolved.
Contractor-owned infrastructure at the border Another form of dependence appears in CBP’s Border Patrol Technical Operations Center, which supports surveillance, network monitoring, cybersecurity operations, and technical services. An October 2026 Request for Information and accompanying industry questions establish that the existing operations facility is contractor-owned. CBP indicated that it would provide government-controlled transition materials to a successor, subject to proprietary, contractual, operational, and security restrictions.
The incumbent, EvoTech LLC, has supported Border Patrol surveillance systems through an arrangement originating under a Federal Aviation Administration contract. CBP also awarded EvoTech a contract valued at approximately $23 million for continued support of the operations center, while separately examining future contracting arrangements. The procurement raises questions about who controls the technical configurations, monitoring tools, operating procedures, and historical records necessary for another contractor to assume responsibility without disrupting border surveillance operations.
The documented costs of staying with incumbents A more direct account of the operational consequences appears in GAO’s August 2026 telecommunications investigation. The watchdog examined the federal government’s transition from legacy telecommunications contracts to the General Services Administration’s Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions program. DHS headquarters officials described problems with providers unable to process orders and complete installations efficiently.
They also told investigators that agencies were reluctant to terminate poorly performing contractors because alternative providers might perform no better. DHS officials described the result as effectively paralyzing transitions at large, geographically dispersed agencies. GAO found that DHS’s monthly legacy telecommunications charges rose from about $5.86 million in February 2025 to $16.85 million in March, attributing the increase to higher prices for legacy technology during the delayed transition.
GAO also found that the government had not adequately assessed whether completed transitions caused service disruptions or whether agencies’ contingency measures worked. Modernization can uncover dependencies accumulated over decades An October 15 DHS procurement justification reveals another problem involving the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the department’s information-sharing platform for government and security partners. DHS extended a modernization contract with BridgePhase LLC for three months after technical and migration difficulties complicated project completion.
According to the justification, HSIN contains customized SharePoint communities developed over 15 to 20 years, some of which evolved into applications whose original developers are no longer available. Reproducing those functions required additional engineering, requirements reconstruction, and validation. The extension also allows BridgePhase to transfer architectural designs, configurations, and outstanding technical issues to a competitively selected successor responsible for operations and maintenance.
The justification does not establish that BridgePhase caused the original knowledge gaps. Rather, it illustrates how years of customization can create institutional dependencies that persist even when an agency competitively replaces a contractor. ICE is confronting a related issue in its immigration records architecture.
An October procurement justification cites incumbent Procentrix’s detailed knowledge of existing data structures and security configurations as grounds for retaining it to integrate ICE’s PLAnet litigation system with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ STACKS digital Alien File repository. Significantly, ICE requires delivery of source code, interface specifications, data schemas, security documentation, and transition materials intended to reduce future dependence on the incumbent.
That requirement suggests the agency recognizes the danger of keeping critical integration knowledge exclusively with a contractor. When continuity becomes dependence The problem extends to the equipment used to collect biometric information. The Coast Guard has standardized proprietary JavelinXL devices and associated Ares software supplied by InCadence Strategic Solutions, a Parsons subsidiary, for its Biometrics at Sea System.
A sole-source procurement justification identifies InCadence as the exclusive source capable of supplying and servicing the devices and supporting software. A subsequent DHS acquisition forecast identifies another follow-on requirement for system sustainment and replacement devices. The operational benefits of standardizing specialized biometric equipment are apparent.
But such decisions can also restrict future competition and increase dependence on manufacturers controlling proprietary interfaces and maintenance capabilities. DHS has taken some steps intended to reduce these risks, including seeking multiple suppliers for biometric capture devices and requiring technical documentation in certain ICE contracts. Whether those safeguards extend consistently across its larger identity, investigative, and surveillance infrastructure remains uncertain.
DHS has also moved to consolidate software purchases through arrangements favoring established distributors and existing technology providers. The emerging concern is not simply that some vendors receive contracts without competition. It is whether successive decisions have left DHS unable to independently maintain, migrate, or replace essential technology without the assistance of the companies already operating it.
KazaSec's take
A newly disclosed vulnerability is only a real risk to your organization once it's confirmed present and exploitable in your own environment, not every CVE applies equally to every network. Knowing the difference is exactly what a proper vulnerability assessment is for.
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